

Wireless LAN 3/3


KIS FRI UNIZA

Vytvorené v rámci projektu KEGA 026TUKE-4/2021

WLAN Authentication and Data Encryption methods

The <u>802.11</u> standard specifies two methods for the authentication: <u>Open System</u> <u>authentication</u> and <u>Shared Key authentication</u>.

- Open System authentication two frames exchange in this process. he first message contains the sending node's 802.11 capabilities. Once the Open System authentication and association is successful, the client becomes a member of the BSS. WEP is not used as part of the Open System authentication process, but WEP encryption <u>can</u> be used to provide data security after a successful authentication and association.
- Shared Key Authentication four authentication messages exchange between client and AP and uses WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) encryption to authenticate the client.
- 1. The client sends the authentication request to the AP.
- 2. The AP sends a clear-text challenge to the client station using an authentication response frame.
- 3. The client station then encrypts the clear-text challenge and sends it back to the AP by using the frame body of the authentication frame.
- 4. The AP decrypts the station's response and compares it to the challenge text. If it matches, the AP will send the final authentication frame to the client and confirms the successful authentication.





WEP - Authentication


- Used for <u>Authentication</u> as well as for <u>data encryption</u>
- Uses RC4 (Rivest Cipher, also called Pseudo Random Number Generator PRNG) cipher for confidentiality and uses CRC-32 checksum for transmission error less integrity
- RC4 is an encryption algorithm, which is known as stream cipher. Stream cipher operates by expanding a short key into an infinite pseudo-random keystream.
- Keystream is a stream of pseudo-random characters that are combined with a plaintext message to produce an encrypted message.
- 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV) and 40-bit (10 4-bit hex characters 0-9 A-F) or 104-bit Secret WEP Key, the purpose of the random IV (2^24 ~ 16 million possible key streams for a Key) is to allow reuse of the same Secret WEP Key for several different messages
- Challenge authentication message sent by AP cleartext message 128 bytes long
 - Encrypted challenge sent by the client, together with cleartext IV and ICV (Integrity Check Value – fixed length hash of the cleartext - 4B)

WEP - Data encryption

- XORs key-stream (K) with plaintext (P) to produce ciphertext (C)
- Per packet encryption IV randomly changes for each packet
- Random IV and Secret Key is combined (IV is pre-pended to K) as an input string for PRNG (24+40 or 24+104) 64-bit or 128-bit RC4 key (or Seed)
- Each device can have up to 4 static WEP keys, Key ID parameter used to identify it








$\frac{|V + key}{seed} \longrightarrow \mathbb{RC4} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{c} 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 &$

WEP - proved insecure therefore already deprecated


Two possible ways of breaking WEP encrypted data:

- 1. To discover the Secret Key itself
- 2. To discover all possible key-streams that a Key can generate
 - RC4 encryption involves XOR-ing the keystream (K) with the plaintext (P) data to produce the ciphertext (C). If an attacker knows any two of these three elements, he can calculate the third. An attacker can always know C because it is broadcast. Thus, if an attacker knows P, he can get K. After he has K, he can recover P in following packets.
 - A dictionary of all (~16M) keystreams that are ~1500B long (packets) only takes about 24 GB to store.
 - I. One method is to wait for repeated keystreams (known via IV), known as a collision, which reveals information about the data and the keystream.
 - *II.* The 2nd method is to know some or all of the data that was encrypted.



WPA - Data encryption

- WPA WiFi Protected Access
- WPA was introduced before 802.11i (~2003) as an intermediate solution to WEP volnurabilities
- Uses RC4 encryption protocol to secure data with TKIP enhancement
- Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) uses the RC4 stream encryption algorithm as its basis. However, <u>dynamically</u> generates a new random 128-bit RC4 key (per-packet key) for each packet.
- WPA included a Message Integrity Check (MIC, using new hashing function Michael). This replaced the CRC.




WPA2 - Data encryption

- WPA2 has been standardize in 802.11i
- 802.11i-2004 is an amendment to original 802.11
- 128-bits Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher algorithm for both authentication and encryption processes, replaces RC4
- Counter Mode with Cipher Block
 Chaining (CCMP) replaces TKIP
 - CCM mode for AES
 - 128-bit keys, 48-bit IV
 - CBC-MAC for the message integrity
- WPA2 still considered secure
- Vulnerability in 4-way handshake

	WEP	WPA	WPA2
	1997	2003	2004
Encryption	RC4	RC4	AES
Key rotation	None	Dynamic session keys	Dynamic session keys
Key distribution	Manually typed into each device	Automatic distribution available	Automatic distribution available
Authentication	Uses WEP key as AuthC	Can use 802.1x & EAP	Can use 802.1x & EAP


WPA/WPA2 – Authentication modes

- WPA Personal mode It is also called WPA-PSK (Pre-Shared Key)
 - Home or small offices
 - No authentication server
 - A secret key shared manually
- <u>WPA Enterprise mode</u> In order to authenticate users and issue new keys that ensure a key
 management it utilizes the IEEE 802.1x standard (port-based access control standard)
 - Requires a RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) server
 - 802.1X standard uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), EAP over LAN (EAPoL) on Ethernet, for authentication
 - Provides additional per user security



WPA/WPA2 – Authentication – 4-way handshaking

- PTK (Pairwise Transient key) is used to encrypt all unicast traffic between a client station and the access point
 - PTK = Pseudo_Random_Function (PMK + Anonce + SNonce + Mac (AA)+ Mac (SA))
- PMK (Pairwise Master Key). Generated from MSK (Master Session Key), which is generated during 802.1x/EAP process or simply Pre-Share Key (PSK)
- **SNonce** STA Nonce
- ANonce AP Nonce




WPA/WPA2 – Authentication

$\left[\right]$		42:e1:69:6d:2b:e6 Routerbo_25:f2:3a	Routerbo_25:f2:3a 42:e1:69:6d:2b:e6	802.11 802.11	123 Association Request, SN=2224 98 Association Response, SN=779		
	317 6.964361… 319 6.967242… 321 6.971740…	Routerbo_25:f2:3a 42:e1:69:6d:2b:e6 Routerbo_25:f2:3a 42:e1:69:6d:2b:e6 Routerbo_25:f2:3a	42:e1:69:6d:2b:e6 Routerbo_25:f2:3a 42:e1:69:6d:2b:e6 Routerbo_25:f2:3a Broadcast	EAPOL EAPOL EAPOL EAPOL 802.11	175 Key (Message 1 of 4) 175 Key (Message 2 of 4) 209 Key (Message 3 of 4) 153 Key (Message 4 of 4) 193 Beacon frame, SN=792, FN=0,		
▶ F ▶ 8	Radiotap Header vO, 802.11 radio informa EEE 802.11 Data, Fl	Length 18 tion ags:F.C	175 bytes captured	(1400 bits)	on interface wlan0, id 0		
	<pre>> Logical-Link Control > 802.1X Authentication Version: 802.1X-2001 (1) Type: Key (3) Length: 117 Key Descriptor Type: EAPOL RSN Key (2) [Message number: 1]</pre>						
	Key Information: 0x008a Key Length: 16 Replay Counter: 1 WPA Key Nonce: 0264e1a87deab169023b8fdf8914a91be4817e95587441478ef63977af3fd79d Key IV: 00000000000000000000000000000000000						
	WPA Key ID: 0000000000000000 WPA Key MIC: 000000000000000000000000000000000 WPA Key Data Length: 22 > WPA Key Data: dd14000fac0499bc7ec61efc21bb5c7799ef52717c95						



LAB MikroTik basic setup



IP addresses & routing table with default route

2.6 Mesh		Address List					
IP MIFLS Routing System Queues Files Log RADIUS Tools New Terminal Dot 1X MetaROUTER Partition Make Supout.rff New WinBox Exit	ARP Accounting Addresses Cloud DHCP Client DHCP Relay DHCP Server DNS Firewall Hotspot IPsec Kid Control Neighbors Packing Pool Routes SMB	D	Find Interface v ether1 wlan1	Address <192.168.114.1/24> Address: 192.168.114.1/24 Network: 192.168.114.0 Interface: wlan1	Ol Can I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	cel bly ble nent by	
windows ►	SIMB SNMP Services Settings Socks TFTP Traffic Flow UPnP Web Proxy	2 items (1 selected) Route List Routes Neithops Rules VRF Dst. Address / Gateway DAS > 0.0.0/0 192.168.1.1 reach DAC > 192.168.1.0/24 ether1 reachable DAC > 192.168.114.0 wlan1 reachable	able ether1	Distance		ind all Pref. Source 192.168.1.19 192.168.114.1	

DHCP	servio	DHCP Server DFCP Networks Leases Options Address Address A Gateway	DNS Servers Domain
Routing Queues Files	ARP Accounting Addresses Cloud DHCP Client	DHCP Server 192.168.114.0/24 192.168.114.1 DHCP Networks Leases Options Option Sets Alerts 192.168.114.0/24 192.168.114.1 H - Image: Server 1 manual sets of the server 1 m	
Log RADIUS Tools New Terminal Dot1X	DHCP Relay DHCP Server DNS Firewall Hotspot	1 item (1 selected) DHCP Server <server1> Generic Queues Script OK Pools Used Addresses</server1>	 × □
MetaROUTER Partition Make Supout.rif New WinBox	IPsec Kid Control Neighbors Packing Pool Routes	Name: server1 Cancel Interface: wlan1 Image: Cancel Relay: Image: Cancel Lease Time: 00:10:00 Image: Cancel Cancel Image: Cancel Concel Image: Cancel Cancel Image: Cancel Cancel Image: Cancel Cancel Image: Cancel Copy Image: Cancel	Find Next Pool 🗸
Windows	SMB SNMP Services Settings	Bootp Lease Time: forever Address Pool: pool1 DHCP Option Set: Src. Address:	
	Socks TFTP Traffic Flow UPnP Web Proxy	Delay Threshold: ▼ Authoritative: yes Bootp Support: static Client MAC Limit: ▼ Use RADIUS: no I item (1 selected)	

Wireless & Security Profile

Wireless Tables WiFi Interfaces W60G Station Nstreme Dual Access List Registration Connect List Security		ireless Tables WiFi Interfaces W60	VG Station	Nationa Dual	Access List	Desistration	Connect List	Security Profile
		▶ × ×		CAP W		etup Repeater		Freq. Usage
Name Mode Authenticatio Unicast Ciphers Group Ciphers WPA Pre-Shared * default dynamic keys WPA2 PSK aes ccm aes ccm *****		Name	△ Type Wireless	(Atheros AR9 (Atheros AR9	Actual MTU	U Tx DO		lx
Security Profile <default></default>	Int	terface <wlan1></wlan1>						
General RADIUS EAP Static Keys OK	G			Nstreme N	V2 Status			ок
Name: default Cancel			ap bridge	-			í	ancel
Mode: dynamic keys Apply			2GHz-B			•		pply
Authentication Types: WPA PSK VPA2 PSK Comment		Channel Width: Frequency:		+		∓ ∓ MHz	'II Di	sable
WPA EAP WPA2 EAP Copy			MikroTik 114			• •••••	Co	nment
Unicast Ciphers: ✓ aes ccm tkip Group Ciphers: ✓ aes ccm tkip Remove		Security Profile:					Advan	ced Mode
		WPS Mode:	push button			₹]	orch
WPA Pre-Shared Key: 1 item WPA2 Pre-Shared Key:		Frequency Mode:	regulatory-do	omain		₹	WPS	Accept
		Country:				Ŧ	(VVP)	S Client
Supplicant Identity: MikroTik		Installation:					Setup	Repeater
Group Key Update: 00:05:00	-	Antenna Gain:	2			dBi	- <u>s</u>	an
Management Protection: disabled								
Management Protection Key:								
default								

Wireless data rates & Tx power


Wireless Tables						Interface <wlan1></wlan1>				
WiFi Interfaces W60G Stat	ion Nstreme Dual	Access List Re	gistration	Connect List	Security Profiles	Nstreme NV2	Tx Power Current	Tx Power Status	Traffic	ОК
+ * * 	CAP WF	S Client Setup	Repeater	Scanner	Freq. Usage	Tx Power Mode:	manual		₹	Cancel
						- Tx Powers				Apply
	/pe lireless (Atheros AR9.	Actual MTU T	x	8.7 kbps	λx 6.0	1Mbps: 0	dBm	2Mbps: 17	dBm	Disable
	ireless (Atheros AR9.			0 bps	0.0	5.5Mbps: 1	dBm	11Mbps: 17	dBm	Comment
Interfaces ordereds						6Mbps: 8	dBm	9Mbps: 17	dBm	Comment
Interface <wlan1></wlan1>						12Mbps: 9	dBm	18Mbps: 17	dBm	Simple Mode
Wireless Data Rates Ad-	vanced HT WDS	S Nstreme NV2	2		ок	24Mbps: 10	dBm	36Mbps: 17	dBm	Torch
- Rate				Ca	ancel	48Mbps: 11	dBm	54Mbps: 17	dBm	WPS Accept
C default C configured						HT20-0: 12	dBm	HT20-1: 17	dBm	WPS Client
					pply	HT20-2: 13	dBm	HT20-3: 17	dBm	Setup Repeater
Supported Rates B: ✔ 1M	bps 🗸 2Mbps 🗸	5.5Mbps 🔽 11M	lbps	Di	sable	HT20-4: 14	dBm	HT20-5: 17	dBm	
Supported Rates A/G: ✔ 6N	bps 🔽 9Mbps	✓ 12Mbps ✓ 18	8Mbps			HT20-6: 15	dBm	HT20-7: 17	dBm	Scan
✓ 24	Mbps 🔽 36Mbps	✓ 48Mbps ✓ 54	4Mbps	Cor	mment	HT40-0: 16	dBm	HT40-1: 17	dBm	Freq. Usage
Basic Rates B: 🗸 1M	bps 2Mbps	5.5Mbps 11N	Abps	Simp	le Mode	HT40-2: 17	dBm	HT40-3: 17	dBm	Align
Basic Rates A/G: 🗸 6N			8Mbps	Т	orch	HT40-4: 18	dBm	HT40-5: 17	dBm	Sniff
						HT40-6: 19	dBm	HT40-7: 17	dBm	C
24	Mbps 36Mbps	48Mbps 54	4Mbps	WPS	Accept					
				WP	S Client					

Setup Repeater

NAT – Network Address Translation

- NAT is an Internet standard that allows hosts on local area networks to use one set of IP addresses for internal communications and another set of IP addresses for external communications.
- **Source NAT** is performed on packets that are originated from an internal network. A NAT router replaces the private <u>source address</u> of an IP packet with a new public IP address (typically outgoing interface) as it travels through the router. Destination address is unchanged. A reverse operation is applied to the reply packets travelling in the other direction.
- Firewall NAT <u>action=masquerade</u> is unique subversion of <u>action=srcnat</u>, it was designed for specific use in situations when public IP on ongoing interface can randomly change, for example DHCP assigned address or newly established PPP tunnel can change it.

NAT – Network Address Translation





Wireless ethical auditing and penetration testing

Dôležité upozornenie:

Zneužitie nástrojov, ktoré sú súčasťou Kali linuxu alebo Aircrack-ng suite, je protiprávne a môže viesť ku trestnému vyšetrovaniu voči osobám, ktoré ich zneužili. Informácie v tomto učebnom materiáli a zmienené nástroje musia byť použité len na výukové účely a so zariadeniami na tento účel určenými.

The misuse of the tools that are part of Kali Linux or Aircrack-ng suite is illegal and can lead to criminal investigations against those who have abused them. The information in this teaching material and the mentioned tools must be used only for teaching purposes and with equipment designed for this purpose.

Wireless auditing and penetration testing tools

- Kali Linux is an open-source, Debian-based Linux distribution geared towards various information security tasks, such as Penetration Testing, Security Research, Computer Forensics and Reverse Engineering.
- Aircrack-ng suite suite of CLI tools used to recover wireless encryption keys and carry all sorts of attacks against wireless networks
- Wifite tool to audit WEP or WPA encrypted wireless networks. It uses aircrack-ng (and other tools) to perform the audit of wireless networks
- Wireshark is the world's foremost and widely-used graphical network protocol analyzer. Deep inspection of hundreds of protocols, many different capture file formats: tcpdump (libpcap), Pcap NG, Catapult DCT2000, Cisco Secure IDS iplog, Microsoft Network Monitor, Network General Sniffer and many others
- **iwconfig** is similar to ifconfig (or ip) but is dedicated to the wireless interfaces. It is used to set the parameters of the network interface which are specific to the wireless operation.

Aircrack-ng suite of CLI tools

- **airbase-ng** Configure fake access points
- **aircrack-ng** Wireless auditing tool password cracker
- aireplay-ng Primary function is to generate traffic for the later use in aircrack-ng
- airmon-ng This script can be used to enable monitor mode on wireless interfaces
 - airmon-ng <start|stop> <interface> [channel] or airmon-ng
 <check|check kill>
- airodump-ng Used for packet capturing of raw 802.11 frames in various formats pcap, ivs, csv, gps, kismet, netxml
- many others

usage: aircrack-ng [options] <input file(s)>

Common options:

-a ≺amode>	:	force attack mode (1/WEP, 2/WPA-PSK)	
-e ≺essid>	:	target selection: network identifier	
-b <bssid></bssid>	:	target selection: access point's MAC	
-p <nbcpu></nbcpu>	:	<pre># of CPU to use (default: all CPUs)</pre>	
-q	:	enable quiet mode (no status output)	
-C <macs≻< td=""><td>:</td><td>merge the given APs to a virtual one</td><td></td></macs≻<>	:	merge the given APs to a virtual one	
-l <file></file>	÷	write key to file. Overwrites file.	

Static WEP cracking options:

-c		search alpha-numeric characters only
-t	2	search binary coded decimal chr only
-h		search the numeric key for Fritz!BOX
-d <mask></mask>		use masking of the key (A1:XX:CF:YY)
-m <maddr></maddr>		MAC address to filter usable packets
-n <nbits></nbits>	2	WEP key length : 64/128/152/256/512
-i ≺index≻	2	WEP key index (1 to 4), default: any
-f <fudge></fudge>	:	bruteforce fudge factor, default: 2
-k <korek></korek>	:	disable one attack method (1 to 17)
-x or -x0	:	disable bruteforce for last keybytes
-x1	2	last keybyte bruteforcing (default)
-x2	÷	enable last 2 keybytes bruteforcing
- X		disable bruteforce multithreading
-у	:	experimental single bruteforce mode
- K		use only old KoreK attacks (pre-PTW)
- s	\$	show the key in ASCII while cracking
-M <num></num>	:	specify maximum number of IVs to use
-D	2	WEP decloak, skips broken keystreams
-P <num></num>	:	PTW debug: 1: disable Klein, 2: PTW
-1	:	run only 1 try to crack key with PTW
-V		run in visual inspection mode
•		an in visual inspection mode


WEP and WPA-PSK cracking options:

-w <words> : path to wordlist(s) filename(s)
-N <file> : path to new session filename
-R <file> : path to existing session filename

WPA-PSK options:

-E <file> -j <file> -J <file> -S</file></file></file>	: create Hashcat file (HCCAP)
- 5	: WPA cracking speed test
-Z ≺sec>	: WPA cracking speed test length of execution.
-r <db≻< td=""><td>: path to airolib-ng database (Cannot be used with -w)</td></db≻<>	: path to airolib-ng database (Cannot be used with -w)

Wireless auditing and penetration testing tools



AUTH ESSID

KIS

PSK MikroTik114

Architekti

PSK

MGT

Wireless adapter with monitor mode capability

WiFi adapter with support of <u>monitor</u> mode (USB dongle TP-LINK TL-WN722N, Alfa AWUS036NHA, others)

 Monitor mode is a data capture mode that allows using a WiFi adapter in listening mode or promiscuous mode. Operating in this mode, WiFi network cards are able to capture all types of WiFi Management packets (including Beacon packets), Data packets and Control packets

ifconfig wlan0
wlan0: flags=4099<UP,BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 2312
 ether 06:90:23:04:0b:02 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
 RX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
 RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
 TX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
 TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0



Wireless adapter with monitor mode capability

Check the status of wlan0 interface

iwconfig wlan0
wlan0 unassociated Nickname:"<WIFI@REALTEK>"
Mode:Auto Frequency=2.412 GHz Access Point: Not-Associated
Sensitivity:0/0
Retry:off RTS thr:off Fragment thr:off
Power Management:off
Link Quality:0 Signal level:0 Noise level:0
Rx invalid nwid:0 Rx invalid crypt:0 Rx invalid frag:0
Tx excessive retries:0 Invalid misc:0 Missed beacon:0

Kill processes that might interfere and set monitor mode for channel 1

└─\$ <u>sudo</u> airmon-ng check kill [sudo] password for kali:	(ka)	l i⊗kali)-[~] <u>do</u> airmon-ng sta:	rt wlan0 1	
Killing these processes: PID Name	РНҮ	Interface	Driver	Chipset
598 wpa_supplicant	phy0	wlan0 (monito	8188eu or mode enabled)	TP-Link TL-WN722N v2/v3 [Realtek RTL8188EUS]

Check the status of wlan0 interface in monitor mode

└─\$ iwco wlan0	nfig wlan0 unassociated Nickname:" <wifi@realtek>"</wifi@realtek>	└─\$ iw dev phy#0
wearro		
	Mode:Monitor Frequency=2.412 GHz Access Point: Not-Associated	Interface wlan0
	Sensitivity:0/0	ifindex 3
	Retry:off RTS thr:off Fragment thr:off	wdev 0×1
	Power Management:off	addr d0:37:45:e4:ce:59
	Link Quality:0 Signal level:0 Noise level:0	type monitor
	Rx invalid nwid:0 Rx invalid crypt:0 Rx invalid frag:0	txpower 13.00 dBm
	Tx excessive retries:0 Invalid misc:0 Missed beacon:0	

Capture wireless 802.11 frames via Wireshark

<u>F</u> ile <u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>Go</u> <u>Capture</u> <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics Telephony <u>W</u> ireless <u>T</u> ools <u>H</u> elp								
🚄 ■ 🧟 🛞 🚞 🖺 🕅 😭 🭳 🔶 🚔 著 👱 📃 🗐 🍳	$\blacksquare \blacksquare \boxtimes \odot \models \blacksquare \boxtimes \boxtimes = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1 = 1$							
Apply a display filter <ctrl-></ctrl->								
Apply a display futer <ctrl></ctrl> No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 28 0.99 de:32:e5:84:b0:68 Broadcast 802.11 264 Beacon frame, SN=3286, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID=Wildcard (Broadcast) 30 1.04 Tp-LinkT_84:b0:68 Broadcast 802.11 239 Beacon frame, SN=3286, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID=VETGEAR83 31 1.05 Routerbo_25:f2:3a Broadcast 802.11 334 Beacon frame, SN=286, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID=VETGEAR83 31 1.05 Routerbo_25:f2:3a Broadcast 802.11 334 Beacon frame, SN=286, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID=VETGEAR83 4 Prame 31: 344 bytes on wire (2752 bits), 344 bytes captured (2752 bits) on interface wlan0, id 0 Image: SN=286, FN=0, Flags=C, BI=100, SSID=METGEAR83 * Frame 31: 344 bytes on wire (2752 bits), 344 bytes captured (2752 bits) on interface wlan0, id 0 Image: SN=286, FN=0, Flags=, C, BI=100, SSID=METGEAR83 * Present flags Header length: 18 Present flags Frame 31: as 0.00 Data Rate: 6.0 Mb/s Channel frags: 0x00e0, Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (0FDM), 2 GHz spectrum Antenna signal: -35 dBm Antenna: 0 P. RX flags: 0x0000 P. RX flags: 0x00000 Provision Subjection Subjection Subj								
<pre>> 802.11 radio information PHY type: 802.11g (ERP) (6) Short preamble: False Proprietary mode: None (0) Data rate: 6.0 Mb/s Channel: 1 Frequency: 2412MHz Signal strength (dBm): -35 dBm > [Duration: 460µs] IEEE 802.11 Beacon frame, Flags:C Type/Subtype: Beacon frame (0x0008) > Frame Control Field: 0x8000 .000 0000 0000 = Duration: 0 microseconds Receiver address: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) Destination address: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) Transmitter address: Routerbo_25:f2:3a (2c:c8:1b:25:f2:3a) Source address: Routerbo_25:f2:3a (</pre>	 The radiotap header format is a mechanism to supply additional information about frames by the driver, flexibility for reporting the characteristics of frames, not part of 802.11 frame header 802.11 radio information provides physical characteristics of the frame MAC layer information follows 							
 ✓ IEEE 802.11 Wireless Management ▶ Fixed parameters (12 bytes) ▶ Tagged parameters (286 bytes) 								




WPA/WPA2 4-way handshake capture and Pre-Shared Key decryption

The misuse of the tools that are part of Kali Linux or Aircrack-ng suite is illegal and can lead to criminal investigations against those who have abused them. The information in this teaching material and the mentioned tools must be used only for teaching purposes and with equipment designed for this purpose.

- When clients connect to WPA/WPA2 encrypted network, they authenticate via 4-way handshake process
- An attacker observes a client connection and obtains:
 - SSID of the Access Point
 - Nonces (they are transmitted in clear text)
 - a message's MIC (Message Integrity Check) computed with a valid PTK
 - MAC addresses (Authenticator and Supplicant)

For each Pre-Shared Key (PSK) guess (list of passphrases in the file), the attacker computes PMK (Pairwise Master Key) and PTK (Pairwise Transient key). It computes MIC out of his PTK, if equal to the captured MIC, the passphrase matches PSK.




- Capture 4-way handshake to recover the pre-shared key
- Decrypt the key offline
- Attack is completely passive
- 1. Enable monitor mode by using command airmon-ng on specific channel
- 2. Look for a wireless network by using command airodump-ng, remember BSSID
- 3. Capture the handshake by using airodump-ng --bssid [MAC] –w dumpfile wlan0 –c 1
- 4. Wait until the client connects
- 5. And appears top-right note

<pre>(kali@kali)-[~] \$ sudo airodump-ngbssid 2C:C8:1B:25:F2:3A -w handshake_capture_file wlan0 -c 1 05:12:46 Created capture file "handshake_capture_file-01.cap".</pre>			
CH 1][Elapsed:	6 s][2022-02-11 0	95:12 🗴 WPA handshake:	2C:C8:1B:25:F2:3A
BSSID	PWR RXQ Beacons	#Data, #/s CH MB	ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
2C:C8:1B:25:F2:3A	-34 1 64	128 61 1 130	WPA2 CCMP PSK MikroTik114
BSSID	STATION	PWR Rate Lost	Frames Notes Probes
2C:C8:1B:25:F2:3A Quitting	42:E1:69:6D:2B:E6	-50 1e-1e 513	143 PMKID MikroTik114

• If no new client appears, alternatively deauthenticate the exiting one

(kali@ kali)-[~]
\$ sudo aireplay-ng -0 1 -a 2C:C8:1B:25:F2:3A -c 42:E1:69:6D:2B:E6 wlan0
05:39:05 Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: 2C:C8:1B:25:F2:3A) on channel 1
05:39:06 Sending 64 directed DeAuth (code 7). STMAC: [42:E1:69:6D:2B:E6] [7|57 ACKs]

• Find list of possible passwords, typically in the directory /usr/share/wordlists and decrypt it



How to protect ourselves:

- 1. WPA2 can have up to 63 characters. Use as many as possible.
- 2. Use not common passphrases, typically the combination of numbers, lower/upper case letters, special chars.



Evil Twin Attack

The misuse of the tools that are part of Kali Linux or Aircrack-ng suite is illegal and can lead to criminal investigations against those who have abused them. The information in this teaching material and the mentioned tools must be used only for teaching purposes and with equipment designed for this purpose.

Evil Twin Attack

- When you connect to a hotel, airport or other company's "free WiFi" network, you are literally
 putting yourself at risk since guests cannot often control the security features of the WiFi
 public connection they're using
- The type of attack on wireless clients where a fake AP is created that pretends to be the original WiFi network (e.g., public hotspot).
 - It uses the same SSID in combination with a powerful directional antenna directed to the target or building.
- Ability to manipulate and control the operation of users who connect through such a fake network
- The traffic is often redirected to the original network or to a public mobile network



Evil Twin Attack

How to protect ourselves:

Smaller hotels, organizations or other operations do not always have a sufficiently secure network, they do not have their own staff to operate the network infrastructure, often one password is used for a long time.

The user's actions:

- 1. Create a hotspot from your mobile phone for sensitive data (banking, payments, email, etc.)
- 2. Use an encrypted VPN connection over a public wireless network
- 3. Use "public WiFi" knob settings in Windows, respectively personal FW & antivirus SW.
- 4. Disable auto-reconnect (don't connect to WiFi automatically)
- 5. Always verify the SSL certificate (HTTPS connections) on the web site.

The operator's actions:

- 1. When using WPA-PSK and WPA2-PSK use a strong enough passwords
- 2. Consider WPA and WPA2 Enterprise (EAP) with 802.1x authentication and RADIUS server
- 3. Hotspot with the assigned private key or password and create a system of distribution of unique keys to users



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